Tarin Kowt, Jan 24 : A shy boy with filthy hands and a shabby tunic approached the great
man, bowed and tried to kiss his hand.
Gen. Matiullah Khan was seated
like a sultan on a cushion in his hojra, his airy receiving room. He barely
looked at the boy. He nodded to an aide, who withdrew a thick wad of Pakistani
rupees from his pocket and handed it to Matiullah.
The most powerful man
in Oruzgan province, a warlord and tribal leader turned police chief, glanced at
the cash. Then Matiullah pressed the entire roll into the boy's
hand.
"Nobody helps the people; it's up to me," Matiullah said as the boy
withdrew.
Thousands of desperately poor Afghans in this remote province
rely on Matiullah for charity and protection. And his presence here is equally
important to the U.S. military, which views Oruzgan as a linchpin in southern
Afghanistan. It relies on Matiullah to support a U.S. special forces team and to
secure the crucial supply road from Kandahar to Tarin Kowt, the provincial
capital.
Matiullah is America's go-to man in Oruzgan, a mountainous
badlands that was a Taliban stronghold before Matiullah beat the insurgents
back.
Not much happens in Oruzgan without Matiullah's blessing. He
approves government appointments and directs government services. He says he has
paid from his own pocket to build 75 mosques, two schools, a hospital and his
own modern police headquarters.
Although he has been accused of
corruption and drug-running — allegations he denies — Matiullah has made himself
indispensable to U.S. interests. Like other Afghan strongmen supported or
tolerated by American forces, he has the gunmen and the iron fist to hold off
the Taliban, even at the cost of undermining the very government institutions
the U.S. is trying to bolster.
Despite attempts to sideline warlords, men
like Matiullah remain in power because the weak and corrupt central government
has little authority, especially in remote areas, and U.S. forces need strong
military allies where the Afghan army is unreliable. President Hamid Karzai
formalized Matiullah's control over Oruzgan by naming him police chief in August
2011.
The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force says its
convoys have suffered only three attacks on the Kandahar-Tarin Kowt supply road
in the last two years. For the last decade, Matiullah's gunmen have secured the
winding dirt road, earning the chief millions of dollars in fees from trucking
companies that contract with ISAF to deliver supplies to Tarin Kowt.
He
says he pays 1,200 gunmen to protect the convoys, in addition to his cops
stationed at posts along the road — meaning he makes a profit from security
provided in part by government-paid police.
ISAF spokesmen deflected
questions about Matiullah's relationship with coalition forces, referring a
reporter to the Afghan Interior Ministry, which directs the Afghan National
Police. Ministry spokesman Sediq Sediqi denied that Matiullah was involved in
the opium trade — a claim made by his political rivals — or that he maintained a
private militia.
Matiullah is literally at the center of the coalition
military presence here. A base for U.S. Special Operations Task Force Southeast
is just 200 yards from his sprawling compound, which is powered by an enormous
generator in a province with no electricity service. An Australian special
operations base lies across a muddy field.
The chief's compound overlooks
a busy military airport where Apache attack helicopters soar toward the
mountains day and night to support Special Forces operations. His reception room
is festooned with photos of him posing with U.S. Special Forces soldiers. There
are framed certificates of appreciation from a series of Special Forces
teams.
One, from a commander in April 2011, reads: "Your superior work
ethic, professionalism, expertise and bravery are the epitome of the Special
Forces motto: The Quiet Professionals."
U.S. special operations
commanders declined to answer questions about Matiullah's role or allow
interviews with the U.S. team here.
Matiullah said special operations
teams visited his compound often, and that he supplied them with security and
intelligence.
"They are my good friends," he said. "They don't know who
are our friends in Oruzgan and who are our enemies. I know very well, so they
rely on me."
Enemies from rival tribes have portrayed Matiullah as a
warlord with his hands on the levers of graft. Matiullah dismisses the
accusations with a wry smile. He considers himself a man of the people and his
government rivals as thieves who steal salaries, weapons and equipment meant for
his 3,160-man police force.
Elders in villages a three-hour drive from
Tarin Kowt praise Matiullah for opening the only roadway from the capital and
lining it with police checkpoints after years of Taliban assassinations and
kidnappings. But they complain that security has not brought help from the
central government in faraway Kabul.
"When the Taliban were here, the
government said they couldn't give us schools and clinics because there was no
security," said Abdul Manan, a leader in the village of Marabat. "Now we have
security, but where is the government?"
Matiullah rose from outwardly
humble origins. A farmer's son, he never attended school. He is illiterate; his
police officers read aloud from official papers before the chief signs them. He
writes his name laboriously on each document.
A decade ago, Matiullah was
a lowly highway cop. He has since built a power base through guile and savvy,
and via his hereditary role as a leader of the powerful Popalzai tribe.
Matiullah said he protected Karzai, a fellow Popalzai, when Karzai took refuge
in Oruzgan as the U.S.-led invasion was toppling the Taliban regime in
2001.
Matiullah then commanded a mountain militia that waged a guerrilla
war against the Taliban in Oruzgan, the birthplace and former power base of the
Taliban's spiritual leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar.
"During the Taliban
time, the people trusted Mullah Omar. Now they trust Matiullah Khan," said
police Lt. Col. Abdullah Sultani, the chief's liaison to the Interior
Ministry.
Matiullah is close to Karzai, who presides over a kleptocracy
in which his cronies have access to graft and sweetheart contracts. The chief
was also close to Karzai's half brother Ahmed Wali Karzai, the political boss of
Kandahar who was assassinated in July 2011 and had been described by U.S.
officials and others as flagrantly corrupt.
Now Matiullah lives in a
mansion on a compound that includes a radio station, swimming pool, rose garden,
guest quarters and mosque. Many of his radio station employees double as police
officers.
He travels in a fleet of Humvees painted green, protected by a
phalanx of cops and gunmen. He says the Taliban, under orders from
Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's intelligence agency, has tried to
assassinate him at least six times. He claims the Pakistani agency directs and
controls the Afghan Taliban.
Matiullah looks nothing like the aging,
paunchy warlords the U.S. relies on elsewhere in Afghanistan. At 38, he is
slender and physically fit, with a trimmed beard and thinning black hair combed
into a widow's peak. He wears a neatly pressed gray wool police general's
uniform, or a pristine white shalwar kameez, the baggy Afghan tunic and
trousers.
He smiles often and projects an air of calm and
civility.
People here say many things about Matiullah, but on this much
they agree: He has brought a measure of stability to a province that two years
ago was dominated by the Taliban.
"Before Matiullah, the police chiefs
were afraid to send their men out of Tarin Kowt," said Faiz Mohammed, a district
governor in Oruzgan. "Matiullah has chased away the Taliban. Now the roads are
open and the police are in their posts there day and night."
In 2010,
then-Oruzgan Police Chief Juma Gul Himat told the New York Times that
Matiullah's security company was "an illegal business" that he tried to shut
down. Now an official at the Interior Ministry in Kabul, Himat says that though
Matiullah's police could use more discipline, the chief has delivered
security.
"I've talked to a lot of villagers and elders in Oruzgan, and
they're all thinking positive about Matiullah Khan," Himat said.
A large
neon sign over the guest quarters features a photo of Matiullah and a message:
"The hero of peace and unity." His photo is pasted to the windshields of police
vehicles. It adorns the walls of rural police posts and the main traffic circle
in Tarin Kowt.
Matiullah is not charitable toward other provincial
officials appointed by the Kabul government. He regards the Oruzgan governor,
Amir Mohammad Akhundzada, with a mixture of scorn and pity, saying he "does
nothing but sit in his office." He is contemptuous of Afghan army units, saying
they're afraid to leave their bases except for major operations.
The
governor declined to discuss Matiullah, saying he was busy. Maj. Gen. Zahir
Azimi, the Afghan army spokesman in Kabul, said the army had had great success
in Oruzgan, working closely with Matiullah's police.
Despite Matiullah's
successes, the Taliban still maintains a presence here.
Insurgents have
mounted two deadly suicide bombings in Tarin Kowt in recent weeks, and roadside
bombs are a constant threat. On Dec. 26, a turncoat police officer and Taliban
cohorts killed three of Matiullah's cops and wounded two others as the men slept
inside a police post less than three miles from Matiullah's
office.
Oruzgan's lucrative opium crop gets to market primarily via roads
controlled by Matiullah's men. Yet he denies any role in drug trafficking,
saying his police recently seized and burned 3 tons of opium on a local road,
arresting 18 men.
The chief also denies accusations by rivals that he has
colluded with the Taliban. "Impossible," he said. "I'm fighting them.... I'm
stronger than they are, so why would I need to work with them?"
ISAF
convoys have been well protected from the Taliban on the Kandahar-Tarin Kowt
road, he said. But over the last decade, he said, 470 of his men have been
killed in Taliban attacks there.
Each week, dozens of supplicants line up
in Tarin Kowt to implore Matiullah for cash or help. He recently boosted
teachers' salaries by $100 a month each, he said. He pays for student
scholarships in Kabul, and for food and clothing for the poor and
dispossessed.
"The government is supposed to provide all this, but they
don't. I do," he said.
And still the demands come.
A police
officer approached the chief at his desk to request money for a police training
course in Kabul. The Interior Ministry had refused to pay, he
complained.
Matiullah shrugged and reached into his pocket. He withdrew a
bundle of cash the size of a pomegranate and peeled off several large bills. The
officer bowed and saluted.
Next was a leathery old man with a soiled
cloak and calloused hands. In a high, squeaky voice, Haji Abdul Wadud poured out
a tale of woe: Heavy rain had flooded his village in nearby Shamansor. He had
pleaded with the governor for help but was turned away.
And another
thing: The village could use a mosque, he told the chief.
Matiullah gave
a dry laugh. He told an officer to help the man write a letter to the governor
demanding help. The chief himself would sign it.
"If he doesn't help you,
come back to me," Matiullah said.
And the mosque? the old man
asked.
Matiullah patted the elder's bony arm. "It's winter now, and
rainy," he said. "But in the spring you will have your mosque."
Ends
SA/EN
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» America's go-to man in Afghanistan's Oruzgan province
America's go-to man in Afghanistan's Oruzgan province
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