Kabul, Dec 29 : Frederick and Kimberly Kagan, a
husband-and-wife team of hawkish military analysts, put their jobs at
influential Washington think tanks on hold for almost a year to work for Gen.
David H. Petraeus when he was the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan.
Provided desks, e-mail accounts and top-level security clearances in
Kabul, they pored through classified intelligence reports, participated in
senior-level strategy sessions and probed the assessments of field officers in
order to advise Petraeus about how to fight the war differently.
Their
compensation from the U.S. government for their efforts, which often involved
18-hour workdays, seven days a week and dangerous battlefield
visits?
Although Fred Kagan said he and his wife wanted no pay in part to
remain “completely independent,” the extraordinary arrangement raises new
questions about the access and influence Petraeus accorded to civilian friends
while he was running the Afghan war.
Petraeus allowed his
biographer-turned-paramour, Paula Broadwell, to read sensitive documents and
accompany him on trips. But the entree granted the Kagans, whose think-tank work
has been embraced by Republican politicians, went even further. The four-star
general made the Kagans de facto senior advisers, a status that afforded them
numerous private meetings in his office, priority travel across the war zone and
the ability to read highly secretive transcripts of intercepted Taliban
communications, according to current and former senior U.S. military and
civilian officials who served in the headquarters at the time.
The Kagans
used those privileges to advocate substantive changes in the U.S. war plan,
including a harder-edged approach than some U.S. officers advocated in combating
the Haqqani network, a Taliban faction in eastern Afghanistan, the officials
said.
The pro-bono relationship, which is now being scrutinized by
military lawyers, yielded valuable benefits for the general and the couple. The
Kagans’ proximity to Petraeus, the country’s most-famous living general,
provided an incentive for defense contractors to contribute to Kim Kagan’s think
tank. For Petraeus, embracing two respected national security analysts in GOP
circles helped to shore up support for the war among Republican leaders on
Capitol Hill.
Fred Kagan, speaking in an interview with his wife,
acknowledged the arrangement was “strange and uncomfortable” at times. “We were
going around speaking our minds, trying to force people to think about things in
different ways and not being accountable to the heads” of various departments in
the headquarters, he said.
The extent of the couple’s involvement in
Petraeus’s headquarters was not known to senior White House and Pentagon
officials involved in war policy, two of those officials said. More than a dozen
senior military officers and civilian officials were interviewed for this
article; most spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss personnel
matters.
Petraeus, through a former aide, declined to comment for this
article.
As war-zone volunteers, the Kagans were not bound by stringent
rules that apply to military personnel and private contractors. They could raise
concerns directly with Petraeus, instead of going through subordinate officers,
and were free to speak their minds without repercussion.
Some military
officers and civilian U.S. government employees in Kabul praised the couple’s
contributions — one general noted that “they did the work of 20 intelligence
analysts.” Others expressed deep unease about their activities in the
headquarters, particularly because of their affiliations and advocacy in
Washington.
Fred Kagan, who works at the conservative American Enterprise
Institute, was one of the intellectual architects of President George W. Bush’s
troop surge in Iraq and has sided with the Republican Party on many national
security issues. Kim Kagan runs the Institute for the Study of War, which favors
an aggressive U.S. foreign policy. The Kagans supported President Obama’s
decision to order a surge in Afghanistan, but they later broke with the White
House on the subject of troop reductions. Both argue against any significant
drawdown in forces there next year.
Petraeus’s successor, Gen. John R.
Allen, allowed the Kagans to stay at the headquarters for his first few months
on the job last year and permitted them to return for two additional short
visits. After the couple’s most recent trip in September, they provided a
briefing on the war and other foreign policy matters to the Republican
vice-presidential candidate, Rep. Paul Ryan of Wisconsin.
The Kagans said
they continued to receive salaries from their think tanks while in Afghanistan.
Kim Kagan’s institute is funded in part by large defense contractors. During
Petraeus’s tenure in Kabul, she sent out a letter soliciting contributions so
the organization could continue its military work, according to two people who
saw the letter.
On Aug. 8, 2011, a month after he relinquished command in
Afghanistan to take over at the CIA, Petraeus spoke at the institute’s first
“President’s Circle” dinner, where he accepted an award from Kim Kagan. To join
the President’s Circle, individuals must contribute at least $10,000 a year. The
private event, held at the Newseum in Washington, also drew executives from
defense contractors who fund the institute.
“What the Kagans do is they
grade my work on a daily basis,” Petraeus said, prompting chortles from the
audience. “There’s some suspicion that there’s a hand up my back, and it makes
my lips talk, and it’s operated by one of the Doctors Kagan.”
Before the
Iraq war hit rock bottom, the Kagans were little-known academics with doctorates
in military history from Yale University who taught at West Point. He
specialized in the Soviets, she in the ancient Greeks and Romans.
In
2005, Fred Kagan jumped to the American Enterprise Institute and joined the
fractious debate over the Iraq war, arguing against the Bush administration’s
planned troop withdrawals. The following year, as sectarian violence engulfed
the country, he convened a strategy session at the institute aimed at developing
a way to win the war. His follow-on research, conducted with his wife and
retired Gen. Jack Keane, the former vice chief of staff of the Army, provided
the strategic underpinning for the troop surge Bush approved in January
2007.
After Obama was elected, he made clear that his strategic priority
was Afghanistan. The Kagans soon shifted focus. In March 2009, they co-wrote an
op-ed in the New York Times that called for sending more forces to
Afghanistan.
When Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal assumed command of the war
that summer, he invited several national security experts to help draft an
assessment of the conflict for Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. The 14-member
group included experts from several Washington think tanks. Among them were the
Kagans.
The members, who were not paid by the military, stayed in Kabul
for six weeks in an advisory role modeled after a similar team Petraeus convened
in 2007 to evaluate the war in Iraq.
The Afghan assessment struck an
alarming tone that helped McChrystal make his case for a troop surge, which
Obama eventually authorized.
The Kagans should have been thrilled, but
they soon grew concerned. They thought McChrystal’s headquarters was not
providing enough information to them about the state of the war. The military
began to slow-roll their requests to visit Afghanistan. In early 2010, they
wrote an e-mail to McChrystal, copying Petraeus, that said they “were coming to
the conclusion that the campaign was off track and that it was not going to be
successful,” Fred Kagan said.
To some senior staff members in
McChrystal’s headquarters, the e-mail read like a threat: Invite us to visit or
we will publish a piece saying the war is lost.
Worried about the
consequences of losing the Kagans, McChrystal authorized the trip, according to
the staff members.
Fred Kagan said the message was not intended to
pressure McChrystal, though he acknowledged, “I imagine that Stan didn’t
appreciate receiving an e-mail like that.”
Indeed, McChrystal did not,
according to the staff members. After an initial meeting in the headquarters,
McChrystal asked his aides to leave the room and he proceeded to voice his
displeasure to the Kagans.
After their trip, which lasted about two
weeks, the Kagans penned a piece for the Wall Street Journal. “Military progress
is steadily improving dynamics on the ground,” they wrote.
“We obviously
came away with .?.?. a more nuanced view that persuaded us that we were
incorrect in the assessment that we had gone in with,” Fred Kagan said in the
interview.
When the couple returned to Kabul in late June 2010, they
planned to stay for eight days. McChrystal had just been fired by Obama, and
Petraeus was heading over to take charge of the war. They expected to meet with
Petraeus, who had become a good friend, and then stick to their agenda of
touring bases in the south.
The Defense Department permits independent
analysts to observe combat operations, but the practice became far more common
when Petraeus became the top commander in Iraq. He has said that conversations
with outside specialists helped to shape his strategic thinking.
The
take-home benefit was equally significant: When the opinion makers returned
home, they inevitably wrote op-eds, gave speeches and testified before Congress,
generally imparting a favorable message about progress under Petraeus, all of
which helped him sell the war effort and expand his popularity.
Other
commanders soon caught on. By the time the Kagans arrived in Kabul in June 2010,
it was commonplace for think-tankers and big-name columnists to make
seven-to-10-day visits once or twice a year. Two analysts from the Council on
Foreign Relations, Max Boot and Stephen Biddle, were in Afghanistan at the same
time at the invitation of Petraeus.
Petraeus asked the four to remain for
a month to six weeks. Boot and Biddle couldn’t stay that long, but the Kagans
were game, even though they had packed for only a short trip.
Petraeus
called them his “directed telescopes” and urged them to focus on the challenge
of tackling corruption and building an effective government in Afghanistan, a
task they addressed with gusto.
“Petraeus relied on the Kagans for a
fresh set of eyes .?.?. because he didn’t have the same nuanced understanding of
Afghanistan that he had of Iraq,” a former aide to Petraeus said.
When
the Kagans told Petraeus they had planned a vacation in August, he urged them to
go ahead. But, Kim Kagan said, “he demanded that we return.”
When they
returned in September 2010, the Kagans’ writ no longer resembled the traditional
think-tank visit or an assessment mission intended to inform an incoming
commander.
They were given desks in the office of the Strategic
Initiatives Group, the commander’s in-house think tank, which typically is
staffed with military officers and civilian government employees. The general’s
staff helped upgrade their security clearances from “Secret” to “Top
Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information,” the highest-level of U.S.
government classification.
The new clearances allowed the Kagans to visit
“the pit,” the high-security lower level of the Combined Joint Intelligence
Operations Center on the headquarters. There, they could read transcripts of
Taliban phone and radio conversations monitored by the National Security
Agency.
“They’d spend hours in there,” said one former senior civilian
official at the headquarters. “They talked about how much they loved reading
intel.”
Their immersion occurred at an opportune time. Petraeus was fond
of speaking about the importance of using troops to protect Afghan communities
from insurgents, but he recognized that summer that the Obama White House wanted
to narrow the scope of the war. As a consequence, the general decided to
emphasize attacking insurgent strongholds — and so did the Kagans.
They
focused on the Haqqani network, which U.S. officials believe is supported by
Pakistan’s intelligence service. Haqqani fighters have conducted numerous
high-profile attacks against U.S. and Afghan targets in Kabul and other major
cities.
The Kagans believed U.S. commanders needed to shift their focus
from protecting key towns and cities to striking Haqqani encampments and
smuggling routes, according to several current and former military and civilian
officials familiar the issue.
In the late summer of 2010, they shared
their views with field officers during a trip to the east. “They implied to
brigade commanders that Petraeus would prefer them to devote their resources to
killing Haqqanis,” said Doug Ollivant, a former senior adviser to the two-star
general in charge of eastern Afghanistan.
But Petraeus had not yet issued
new directives to his three-star subordinate or the two-star in the east. “It
created huge confusion,” a senior military officer said. “Everyone knew the
Kagans were close to Petraeus, so everyone assumed they were speaking for the
boss.”
While the Kagans refused to discuss their work in detail — they
said it was privileged and confidential — Fred Kagan insisted that they were
careful to note before every meeting “that we were not speaking for
Petraeus.”
“We did have a number of occasions where we sparred with local
staffs,” Fred Kagan said. He said he and his wife wanted to facilitate
conversations about vital tactical issues, exposing field commanders “to
different ideas and different ways of looking at the problem.”
“Some
people agreed with us,” he said, “and some people didn’t.”
The Kagans are
prolific contributors to debates about national security policy, cranking out a
stream of op-eds and convening panel discussions at their respective
institutions. But once they began working for Petraeus, they ceased writing and
commenting in public.
“When we were in Afghanistan .?.?. we were not
playing the Washington game,” Fred Kagan said. “We were not thinking about
anything . ?.?. except how to defeat the enemy.”
He insisted he and his
wife will never write a book about their work for Petraeus. “It is important to
preserve the confidence and the integrity of the command climate,” Kim Kagan
said.
Although they functioned as members of Petraeus’s staff, they said
they did not want to be paid. “There are actual patriots in the world,” Fred
Kagan said. “It was very important to me not to be seen to be profiting from the
war.”
Military officials said the Defense Department travel rules permit
civilian experts to provide services to the military without direct
compensation. A spokesman for the U.S. Central Command, Col. John Robinson, said
that the military was still examining to what extent Petraeus’s arrangement with
the Kagans “satisfied regulations regarding civilian services to government
organizations.”
The Kagans’ volunteerism was an open secret at the
headquarters, and it bred suspicion. Some officers questioned whether they
funneled confidential information to Republican politicians — the Kagans said
they did not. Others worried that the couple was serving as in-house spies for
Petraeus.
A colonel who worked for Petraeus said the Kagans “did great
work,” but “the situation was very, very weird. It’s not how you run a
headquarters.”
Allen, who succeeded Petraeus in July 2011, did not want
to continue his predecessor’s arrangement with the Kagans, but he also did not
want to upset them. Allen allowed them to stay for a few months. Two subsequent
visits were kept to less thana month, according to a senior official in the
Allen headquarters.
For Kim Kagan, spending so many months away from
research and advocacy work in Washington could have annoyed many donors to the
Institute for the Study of War. But her major backers appear to have been
pleased that she cultivated such close ties with Petraeus, who went from Kabul
to head the CIA before resigning this fall over his affair with
Broadwell.
At the August 2011 dinner honoring Petraeus, Kagan thanked
executives from two defense contractors who sit on her institute’s corporate
council, DynCorp International and CACI International. The event was sponsored
by General Dynamics. All three firms have business interests in the Afghan
war.
Kagan told the audience that their funding allowed her to assist
Petraeus. “The ability to have a 15-month deployment essentially in the service
of those who needed some help — and the ability to go at a moment’s notice —
that’s something you all have sponsored,” she said.
She called her work
for him “an extraordinary and special occasion.”
After accepting the
award, Petraeus heaped praise on the institute.
“Thanks to all of you for
supporting an organization that General Keane very accurately described as
filling a niche — a very, very important one,” he said. “It’s now a deployable
organization. We’re going to start issuing them combat service
stripes.”
Ends
SA/EN