Softly, softly in the Taliban's den

Kabul, Feb 9 : In five years, US military might, from daisy-cutter bombs to high-tech weaponry, could not smoke out the Taliban, who retreated to the mountains of Afghanistan after being forced from power in 2001.

They emerged last year of their own volition after being welcomed back into the community by various tribal groups, many of which are ready to join in a mass uprising planned for the spring.

Seasoned British officers assigned in southern Afghanistan to clean up the mess created by the Americans can sense that big trouble is simmering, but they are convinced that any aggressive policy will aggravate the situation.

They realize that they have to accept the Taliban's existence as a reality, strike peace deals with them and allow them into the political power-sharing apparatus. This, they argue, can be done through extensive reconstruction, which is the only way to isolate hardline insurgents. Military might, therefore, is to be used only for the security of the people, not for aggressive armed campaigns.

In southwestern Afghanistan, the city of Kandahar and its environs are the Taliban's main focus. However, their main strategic back yard is Helmand province, from where they raise human and material resources with money flowing from poppy cultivation. In the spring, Helmand will be the main engine for the Taliban's planned capture of Kandahar and the proposed push to Kabul.

Helmand, understandably, has in recent months been the center of the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF's) operations, with heavy US bombings and frequent engagements between the Taliban and British ground troops.

All the same, the Taliban claim that of 17 districts in the province, they are now in control of 13, either partially or completely. The deputy British Task Force commander of Helmand province, Colonel Ian Huntley, dismisses this claim. In an interview with Asia Times Online, however, he did agree that the Taliban had secured some pockets of Helmand.

In response, the ISAF is redefining its approach, ranging from a "definition of the enemy" to the role of foreign forces in society.

"There is no military solution to the insurgency," said Nic Kay, the British regional coordinator for southern Afghanistan. Kay is a seasoned official of the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) and heads all operations in Helmand province. He previously served in Pakistan and Afghanistan, besides serving as a senior desk officer handling Afghanistan and Pakistan in the FCO.

"It would be a blunder if we assess the situation with a single-track mind. We need to appreciate the fact that 'Taliban' is a generic name and there are a whole lot of reasons behind the support for the Taliban in southwestern Afghanistan," Kay told Asia Times Online in his newly built office at the British task force camp in Lashkar Gah, Helmand province.

"One of the reasons for Taliban support is loyalty to local commanders, and the sense at the moment is one of injustice, poor governance, corruption and general incompetence. Once we tackle these problems, it will be easy for us to find solutions," Kay said.

"We have conducted research, which does not have any scientific basis but it is based on our feelings. After talking to the people, we believe there are two types of Taliban - one reconcilable and the other irreconcilable. The reconcilable Taliban are about 80%, and they are disgruntled because of bad governance and corruption. The irreconcilable Taliban are those who are ideologically motivated and loyal to their command structures. They are hardly 20%. We need to carefully assess both trends separately and deal with the situation accordingly," Kay said.

In a related move, the governor of Helmand province has been replaced by Asadullah Wafa, a former royalist and expert on tribal affairs. His task is to revive tribal structures destroyed by warlords and later by the Taliban.

District shuras (councils) have been established across the province to make contact with the Taliban. The traditional structures of tribal elders and mullahs are part of the shuras, which to date have struck peace deals in Sangeen and Nawzad districts. A peace agreement in Musa Qala was secured some months ago.

"These peace agreements are actually a blessing for the people of Helmand province as they have got rid of the fighting. In the meantime, it allows us to address people's concerns, like law and order and development work," said Kay.

"For instance, three weeks ago the Afghan Auxiliary Police were deployed in Musa Qala. The police have been stationed for the protection of specific development projects like the National Solidarity Program, which is being undertaken by the Bangladeshi NGO [non-governmental organization] BRAC [Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee]. This includes the construction of new mosques and schools, and in the meantime, with the help of the shura, we have make sure that the Taliban do not disrupt these development works," Kay said.

Kay acknowledged that despite the peace agreements, the Taliban still move around relatively freely and that the shuras themselves comprise pro-Taliban people. But Kay is confident that as long as all the protocols of the agreements are implemented, gradually the writ of the Afghan government will become stronger and the hardline Taliban will be isolated.

Huntley reiterated: "Our whole counterinsurgency approach rotates around rebuilding, reconstruction and providing security. We do not aim to chase the Taliban in the population.

"In December, in Operation Baaz Tsuka, we cleared Taliban pockets around Highway 1, which is the main artery for the supplies of UK troops between Kandahar and Camp Bastion, Helmand. In addition, we aim to provide security at the Kajaki dam project [near the source of the Helmand River]. The dam will generate 500 megawatts of hydroelectric power. We conducted an operation in the north of Helmand to provide security to the whole infrastructure of dam and the transmission routes and cleared the area of insurgents," Huntley said.

The British task force in Helmand is clearly taking careful steps not to challenge the Taliban directly, but through invoking tribal structures to isolate them, and through measures such as permanent vehicle control points, which limit their movements.

These are practical steps, but some feel it might be a case of too little too late. "Had our plans been implemented two years ago, the situation now would be diametrically opposite," commented a junior official of the FCO on condition of anonymity. "We have just started our plans, and the Taliban have already reinforced their positions and geared up for their massive spring offensive. I am afraid we missed the boat."

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SA/EN