Kabul, Dec 13 : With a vast, empty desert as a backdrop, the militants recorded the
execution of Khan Wali on video. As someone held a camera, the others encircled
the condemned man to read out his sentence.
“This is not brutality –
this is justice,” declared one of the executioners who sported a black turban
and a shaggy beard. “I swear to God that killing him with a 82 mm mortar is not
enough. But the rest of our Mujahedin would not agree on my recommendation – to
kill him in a way that all can take part in the act.”
And so it was
decided to shoot Khan Wali with the 82 mm mortar. They forced him to kneel 40
yards away from the portable cannon, a type often used in small battles in the
war-torn country. A militant positioned behind the weapon then set it off; a
massive thumping sound was followed by celebratory cries of Allah u Akbar – God
is Great. “Be careful, don’t get any blood on your clothes” said one voice as
the other men, after jubilantly hugging each other, rushed to poke at Khan
Wali’s flesh splattered on the ground. “I enjoyed this very much,” said
one.
What was Khan Wali’s crime? He was protecting one of Afghanistan’s
most important resources: water. Khan Wali led a 60-man semi official-militia
tasked with defending the Machalgho dam in eastern Paktia province. Already two
years behind schedule due to security concerns, the dam would irrigate about
40,000 acres of land and produce 800 KW of electricity once completed. The
government had pledged that if Khan Wali held his ground for two months, he and
his men would receive weapons and cash. But Khan Wali lasted only 20 days into
the mission.
His remains were recovered eight days after his savage
execution, his nephew Agha Jan told TIME. His upper body was completely in
pieces. “We recognized him from the tattoo he had and the shoes he had been
wearing – his name was tattooed on his hand since childhood.” The video of the
brutal execution, which took place in mid-2011, was shared with journalists
months later and uploaded to YouTube.
“With such bravery, he had tried to
protect the dam – and they killed him so brutally,” says Rohullah Samoon, a
senior aide and spokesman to the governor of Paktia.
Water is a critical
issue in Afghanistan—and for countries like Iran and Pakistan that are dependent
on four of the five river basins that flow out of Afghanistan to irrigate their
territories. Meanwhile, though the Afghans currently have enough water for their
own needs, any perception of abundance is illusory, experts say. Indeed, the
availability of water per capita is expected to decline by 50% in the next three
decades, according to a United Nations-funded report. Afghanistan’s extremely
weak infrastructure and one of the lowest water storage capacities in the world
means that large parts of the country cannot make use of their own water
resources. Frequent droughts, localized and national, further affect the
population, causing food shortages and migration. In 2008, for example, wheat
production declined by 40% to 55% due to lack of precipitation.
Water is
key to strengthening the foundations of Afghanistan’s mainly agricultural
economy. But only about 5% of the massive international investment and aid in
the past decade went to the water sector, according to the UN report. And,
critics say, too much of that went to ad-hoc small dams and schemes that had no
long-term vision.
The geopolitical factors are such that Afghans are
paranoid that both Iran and Pakistan are sabotaging their efforts to build dams
and control their hydro-resources—though the evidence is circumstantial and
speculative at best. For example, there were broad hints that elements in
Pakistan may have contributed to the death of Khan Wali. Says one local official
in Paktia: “The price that our neighbors pay for a human life around here? It’s
50,000 Pakistani rupees [about $500].”
It is true, however, that
Pakistan’s energy crisis has furthered its dependence on Afghan water. Iran, the
only country that Afghanistan has a water treaty with, is now taking up to 70%
more water than agreed to, according to officials, and has built infrastructure
on the incoming water without Afghanistan’s consent. If Afghanistan tries to
build major dams to hold more of its own water, both Pakistan and Iran are
likely to object and to hold up the projects. Indeed, because diplomatic
objections can create bureaucratic bottlenecks, major aid donors have
increasingly shied away from funding water projects in Afghanistan.
An
official at the Afghan ministry of energy and water claims that the World Bank
called off funding for a major project after it learned that it required
clearance from Iran. The World Bank would not comment, saying only that it did
not have projects in Afghanistan’s water sector. “I think our neighbors have
better relations with the major donors – such as the World Bank,” the official
said accusingly. They lobby to get bigger loans for themselves, but create
hurdles on the way of such projects in Afghanistan, he says.
“Out of
fifty seven billion cubic meters of average annual rivers flow, only less than
30% is consumed in Afghanistan, the remaining part of water flows out into
neighboring countries,” says Sayed Sharif Shobair, a water expert with several
years of experience with national and internationalagencies in Afghanistan.
“Attracting investment in the water sector from donor agencies may require us to
resolve transboundary water issues first.”
“The Afghan government, every
now and then, announces the building of 20 dams or so. But it remains only plans
on paper because they can rarely gather the funding for it,” says Khwaga Kakar,
an independent researcher who spent two years on the U.N.-funded report on
Afghanistan’s water resources. “There is a disconnect between ‘we plan to do’
and ‘what the donors are giving us.’”
The anxieties about Iranian and
Pakistan meddling are exemplified by the speculation around the long stalled
Salma dam, being built by India in the province of Herat in western Afghanistan,
which borders Iran. The dam has the potential to irrigate nearly 185,000 acres
and produce 42 MW electricity. However, the project is already four years behind
schedule. Its cost has doubled and is expected to rise by another 50%. Some
Afghan officials are astonished that Indian engineers, who have built highways
in Afghanistan in record time, are taking so long to complete the dam. They
hypothesize that Iranian diplomatic meddling has caused the delays.
The
Indians, however, deny it. “Afghans tell us that Iran has created issues, but we
haven’t had to talk to Iran about it because we haven’t had evidence linking
them to insecurity there,” says Gautam Mukhopadhaya, the Indian ambassador to
Kabul, blaming the delay on cost escalation. “The Salma dam will be completed,
no question about that.”
Lack of data is the biggest hurdle, says senior
Afghan diplomat Enayatullah Nabiel who worked on the trans-boundary water issues
for several years. And many Afghans look suspiciously upon the Iranian experts
who moved in to fill the expertise gap by setting up the research center inside
Afghanistan’s water ministry tasked with gathering information and data on the
country’s water resources. The Iranian experts provide what other countries and
companies no longer do because of the fragile security within Afghanistan. But
the result is increased suspicion. Says Nabiel, “The fact that Iranians are
involved in running the research center inside the ministry of water is very
dangerous – they have loyalty to their own country.”
Some analysts say
Afghanistan—given its already grave security issues—should seek
non-confrontational methods of solving its cross-border water problems. “It
might be good if Afghanistan could move in some specific cases from ‘water
sharing’ to ‘river benefit sharing,’ says Shobair. “In Kunar river, for example,
joint hydropower production could be one idea to look into. Afghanistan could
convince Pakistan that is for their good as well.”
But that process
requires protracted negotiations with the neighbors. Margaret Vick, who advised
the ministry of water and energy on cross-border water laws, says the government
has capable diplomats and negotiators but has to use them to deal with other
crises. She adds that the ministry continues to have other deficiencies that
have not been dealt with in decades. “Pre-Soviet invasion,” she explains, “the
government had an engineering branch to work on water and other infrastructure
issues of national importance.” Today however, she says, “it’s the depth of
engineering capability that has not yet
recovered.”
Ends
SA/EN
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» What Iran and Pakistan want from the Afghans: Water
What Iran and Pakistan want from the Afghans: Water
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